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ABSTRACT: Initial reports about the new COBRA premium subsidy program for recently 
laid-off workers indicate that enrollment in COBRA continuation coverage has increased 
substantially, with a healthier mix of individuals enrolling than before. Moreover, imple-
mentation has gone smoothly, and most eligible people have heard about the subsidy. Still, 
many of those who are eligible cannot afford to purchase COBRA coverage, even with 
the 65 percent premium subsidy. Very high subsidies and very easy enrollment are likely 
needed to enroll all, or nearly all, newly unemployed people who lack another source of 
affordable coverage. If the subsidies are extended beyond February 2010, Congress should 
provide new assistance in ways that are consistent with the existing administrative infra-
structure and rules for both COBRA and the ARRA subsidies.
                    
OveRvIeW
In February 2009, Congress created a temporary but important new subsidy 
for unemployed workers’ health insurance. Under a provision of the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), the federal government funded 
65 percent of COBRA health insurance premiums for workers laid off between 
September 2008 and December 2009 to allow them to continue their workplace 
coverage for up to nine months.1 ARRA sought to increase access to coverage 
quickly by building upon existing COBRA mechanisms. The legislation eased 
implementation by transferring subsidies in bulk to employers or insurers—they 
subtract subsidies from payroll taxes otherwise owed—rather than to one eligible 
person at a time through credits or vouchers.
In December 2009, Congress extended ARRA in two ways: it lengthened 
the subsidies from 9 to 15 months, thus helping the many enrollees whose assis-
tance was ending; and it qualified for subsidies workers laid off through February 
28, 2010. Congress is likely to revisit the issue in early 2010 if (as seems virtually 
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is unaffordable for most laid-off workers, who lose 
income but face much higher premiums than the typi-
cal 17 percent share paid by active employees with 
self-only coverage.5 In practice, no more than 20 per-
cent of eligible people typically enrolled in COBRA 
prior to ARRA, and, on average, they generated about 
$1.50 in medical spending for each premium dollar, 
according to Spencer and Associates, which generates 
the only regular reports on COBRA experience.6
The new subsidy substantially increases COBRA 
“take up,” but still only for a minority of people  
who are eligible.
Our interviewees among large and mid-sized firms 
almost unanimously reported increases in COBRA 
participation—often substantial ones. Hewitt and 
Associates, a human resources consulting and out-
sourcing firm, reported that average COBRA take-up 
doubled after ARRA took effect, from 19 percent to 38 
percent (exhibit).7 The firm’s data come from 200 very 
large firms representing almost 5 percent of U.S. work-
ers and their dependents. Its pre-ARRA levels are con-
sistent with Spencer and Associates’ findings. Increases 
occurred throughout the economy and were especially 
large within sectors where prior take-up rates among 
COBRA-eligible workers had been comparatively low.
Much lower COBRA take-up, both before and 
after ARRA, is reported by Ceridian Corporation, a 
business services firm known for COBRA administra-
tion.8 It found an average increase in take-up of 43 
percent—a rise from 12.4 to 17.7 percent—among 
50,000 employers with a total of 7.3 million employ-
ees. Ceridian’s post-subsidy take-up is slightly below 
the pre-subsidy rates from both Spencer and Hewitt, 
perhaps because Ceridian’s client employers differ in 
average wages, benefits culture, or other factors.
These pre- and post-ARRA comparisons almost 
certainly underestimate the legislation’s effects, albeit 
to an unknown extent. The reason is that they incor-
porate everyone offered COBRA coverage, including 
those individuals who qualify because of voluntary 
departure, divorce, or death—which ARRA does not 
address. Better comparisons would focus only on 
involuntary lay-offs both before and after ARRA, as 
certain) unemployment rates remain high. In addition, 
pending legislation proposes to make further changes 
to ARRA.2 This issue brief describes the early experi-
ence with the ARRA subsidy, based on a literature 
scan, some initial enrollment data, and interviews with 
consumer-group and union officials, benefits managers 
and consultants, health plan staff, and federal officials.3 
Among the major findings and conclusions are:
ARRA has increased—perhaps doubled—•	
COBRA participation, and the addition of the 
subsidy has attracted a healthier mix of enrollees 
than before.
Implementation has been remarkably smooth, •	
especially with the tight timeframe.
Most eligible people seem to have heard about •	
the new program.
The new federal subsidy has, in some cases, •	
displaced assistance previously provided by 
some large private employers.
COBRA is very valuable for those who can use •	
it but targets only one segment of the nation’s 
uninsured. Moreover, many eligible workers are 
unable to afford the 35 percent premium share.
If ARRA’s subsidies are extended, Congress •	
should provide new assistance in ways that 
are consistent with existing processes to avoid 
backlash from imposing a second set of “crash” 
changes within a year.
Key FIndIngS
Before ARRA was implemented, COBRA filled a  
big gap in insurance but enrolled a small share  
of eligible people.
People who become unemployed often also lose their 
health insurance, but COBRA lets them stay covered 
by paying their former employer’s average claims 
cost, plus 2 percent for administration.4 Employers 
have objected that COBRA costs them too much, 
because it attracts older and sicker people. Consumer 
advocates, meanwhile, have contended that COBRA 
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only workers involuntarily terminated from employ-
ment qualify for ARRA.
ARRA may have reduced the excess of medical 
spending over premiums for COBRA enrollees.
As noted above, employer costs are typically higher 
for COBRA enrollees than active workers. The main 
reason is adverse selection—that is, disproportionate 
enrollment by higher-risk people who expect to need 
health care and so are willing to pay full premiums.9 
Also, COBRA enrollees know their coverage will soon 
end, so they may use their insurance with unusual 
intensity while they are paying for it.10 In principle, 
ARRA’s subsidy should attract a more balanced mix of 
risks, just as employers’ premium contributions do for 
active workers. Credible data on post-ARRA claims 
are not yet available, but some interviewees reported 
that younger people seem to be enrolling and that very 
early claims trends seem better than before.
ARRA was rapidly implemented with surprisingly 
few problems and at manageable cost.
Federal implementation was remarkable, especially 
given the multiple agencies involved. The lead agen-
cies, the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the U.S. 
Department of Labor, both produced needed guid-
ance for firms and appropriate new processes in very 
short order, even without new administrative funding 
for their efforts.11 One benefits manager told us that, 
although she normally likes to complain about govern-
ment, these agencies “did a bang-up job here.”
Private firms faced early uncertainty and “a 
scramble” to respond, as one interviewee described it. 
After employer responsibilities were clarified, firms 
faced an intense but time-limited effort to alter exist-
ing outreach, enrollment, and premium collection 
processes. Some interviewees castigated ARRA as 
burdensome—initially “a bit of a nightmare,” said one, 
though adding that it was soon running “smoothly.” 
Most interviewees, at least in hindsight, saw imple-
mentation as only a short-term push—a “nuisance” or 
“distraction”—rather than a major new cost.
Nearly all concerns expressed by our inter-
viewees related to the eligibility and enrollment pro-
cesses. There was some grousing that employers had to 
finance the “float” between enrollment and recoupment 
of the 65 percent federal share through a tax-withhold-
ing offset. But the process for paying subsidies drew no 
complaints and was perceived to occur as a matter  
of routine.
ARRA’s new provisions have been successfully 
communicated to firms and eligible ex-employees.
Federal communication with stakeholders seems good. 
More important, eligible workers also seem aware of 
their rights, as a general rule. The most convincing evi-
dence is that neither consumer nor union interviewees 
said they had “heard any screaming,” as they often do 
about problems. Moreover, workers have made heavy 
use of the Department of Labor’s new appeals mecha-
nism for eligibility denials: some 70,000 appeals were 
lodged through August, whereas pre-ARRA the depart-
ment typically received only 59,000 telephone inqui-
ries a year about any aspect of COBRA.12
21 Industry Sectors
Pre-ARRA Rate
(Sept. 2008 to 
Feb. 2009)
Post-ARRA Rate
(March 2009 to 
June 2009)
Percentage 
Change
Cross-industry average 19% 38% 100%
Median 25% 52% 108%
change in top pre-ARRA quartile  13%–97%
change in bottom pre-ARRA quartile 189%–267%
Note: The quartile presentations exclude the highest outlier and the lowest outlier.
Source: Hewitt Associates press release, Aug. 18, 2009.
ARRA Subsidy and Rate of Take-Up of COBRA Coverage
(200 large U.S. firms, with 8 million employees, in 21 sectors)
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OTheR OBSeRvATIOnS
A number of interviewees at large national firms 
reported that, before ARRA, they offered laid-off 
workers severance packages that included signifi-
cant health insurance premium contributions. Several 
reported reducing or dropping this benefit in reaction 
to ARRA. However, it is unknown how common such 
severance packages were among laid-off workers as a 
whole prior to ARRA, how many firms changed their 
behavior in response to the federal legislation, and how 
many workers have been affected by such changes.13
One union interviewee called COBRA a mere 
“Band-Aid” compared with the scope of uninsurance. 
Indeed, COBRA is, by its nature, an incremental pro-
gram. So too is ARRA’s subsidy, which helps only 
those people able to afford their share of the premium. 
Many eligible workers are unable to afford their 35 
percent premium share, as interviewees often noted. 
Laid-off workers with low incomes are dispropor-
tionately left behind, as they are more likely to have 
lacked employer health benefits before they were 
terminated—and thus are ineligible for COBRA and 
the subsidy.14
The federal cost of the ARRA subsidy is subject 
to challenge at a time of large deficits, but should be 
seen in perspective. If COBRA-eligible workers were 
still employed, federal tax exclusions would effectively 
finance an average of just over 32 percent of their pre-
miums15—almost half the ARRA subsidy level. Buying 
COBRA also helps reduce uncompensated medical 
care and likely some Medicaid enrollment, creating at 
least a measure of offsetting savings at multiple levels 
of government.16
Our key informants mainly supported the ARRA 
subsidy and its possible extension as very helpful for a 
needy group of people. This support was not uniform, 
but it was surprising, given the many years of negative 
comments about COBRA from employers and benefits 
consultants.17
ImpLICATIOnS FOR pOLICy
With regard to possible extensions of the ARRA 
subsidy to layoffs beyond February 2010, as well 
as proposals to increase the generosity of premium 
subsidies and to provide a further “look back” period,18 
our work suggests the following:
Carrying subsidy eligibility forward to cover •	
layoffs after February 2010 is consistent 
with the goals of the original legislation, as 
unemployment remains high despite signs of 
economic recovery and is forecast to continue at 
elevated levels.
Lawmakers’ recent increase in the duration •	
of ARRA subsidies responded to long-term 
unemployment rates that have been at the 
highest levels ever recorded by the Labor 
Department.19
Like the ARRA extension enacted in December, •	
any further changes should comport with the 
existing administrative infrastructure and rules 
for both COBRA and initial ARRA subsidies, to 
avoid backlash from imposing a second set of 
“crash” changes within a year.
Adding an additional five months of •	
retroactivity, as proposed by H.R. 3930, would 
be burdensome for employers and insurers. 
Significant administrative challenges could 
result if firms’ eligibility determinations starting 
in January 2010 had to go back more than a 
year and a half, to layoffs starting April 1, 2008. 
In contrast, ARRA required only a five-month 
“look back” from February 2009 to the prior 
September.
Policymakers could encourage employers •	
to include premium payments in severance 
packages by giving firms a tax credit covering 
perhaps 50 percent of payments for ARRA-
eligible workers. If such a credit encouraged 
more firms to make these payments, the costs 
per new enrollee would fall both for government 
and for each worker.
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Very high subsidies and very easy enrollment •	
are needed to enroll all, or nearly all, newly 
unemployed people who lack another source 
of affordable coverage. Interviewees from 
all perspectives agreed that even COBRA 
premiums subsidized by ARRA are too costly to 
help many laid-off workers.
ARRA experience suggests some lessons for 
comprehensive reform as well:
Timely and stakeholder-sensitive •	
implementation can create goodwill for a new 
policy, even among those for whom it appears 
somewhat adverse to their economic interests.
2  Section 1009 of the Department of Defense 
Appropriations Bill for 2010, Pub. Law No: 
111–118; see M. P. McQueen, “COBRA Benefits 
Expanded,” Wall Street Journal, Dec. 22, 2009, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487
04304504574610550356800752.html. Also see M. 
Singletary, “A Subsidy for Those Most in Need,” 
Washington Post, Dec. 3, 2009.
3 The authors used structured protocols to interview 
26 key informants, including consumer-group and 
union officials, benefits managers at large and 
medium-sized firms, benefits consultants, and staff 
at health plans, the Department of Labor, and the 
Treasury Department.
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Implementation can be easier when a new •	
initiative builds upon a preexisting program. 
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administrative processes or in the categories of 
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Enrollment into COBRA plans and funding •	
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because of trade liberalization.20
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